"Centrists Should Mourn the Demise of the Filibuster: Only the extremists win—and in the end, mostly the Republicans."

A Slate headline, quoted in its entirety at Instapundit, as if he's not seeing the snark.

To see the snark, examine the logic

1. After the filibuster, only the extremists will win.

2. Most of the winners will be Republicans.

3. [Unstated.] Most of the extremists are Republicans. 

What counts as "extremism"? In this context, it has to do with how we think about judges. (And executive nominees, but I'll leave them to the side for simplicity's sake.) The "extreme" should be understood as the more ideologically slanted or threateningly powerful individuals that the President would otherwise have refrained from nominating. But even with the minority party disabled by the inability to filibuster, there are political constraints.

Obama can't just nominate, say, Bill Ayers.
He won't want the criticism, and there will be pressures on members of his own party to say no. The old game of letting the minority party do the dirty work has changed. The other party will still do what it can to trash the reputation of the nominee, but the President's own party will have to vote that nominee down or take the political heat for voting for this awful character.

I suspect that the political check will be more of a constraint on Democrats, because it seems that American voters perceive conservative judicial ideology as more conventional, proper, and neutral than liberal judicial ideology. And this is essentially the insight in the Slate article (which is written by Eric Posner). And by essentially, I mean subtract the subterfuge in the part I've boldfaced:

Next time Republicans control the presidency and the Senate, they will appoint ideologically extreme judges. True, Democrats could cancel out this effect by appointing extremely liberal judges when they are in power, but recent history suggests that Democrats do not care as much as the Republicans about appointing ideologically extreme judges. Unless this changes, picture a federal appellate bench composed of numerous Antonin Scalias and Clarence Thomases, not fully offset by Elena Kagans and Stephen Breyers.

Let me restate the boldfaced part to say what I think is true:  Democrats know that the vigorous left-liberals they'd like to see on the bench would be viewed by the American people as ideologically extreme and unsuited for judicial work.

The reason the Republicans seem to get away with leaning further toward conservatism than Democrats can lean toward liberalism is that conservatism better comports with the people's idea of the role of the judiciary.

Removal of the filibuster helps conservatives not because they are more "extremist" than Republicans, but because the political check on nominating strong judges operates more forcibly on liberals. 

Why is the NYT publishing yet another article on the fact that Justice Ginsburg is not resigning from the Supreme Court?

I was a bit surprised to see this article, with a big picture, at the top center of the NYT on-line front page today. It's utter non-news. So what's the point? She did an interview with Adam Liptak, but just last June, we'd heard the same thing, in the pages of the NYT, from Linda Greenhouse.

Let's look at Liptak's article as opposed to the front-page teaser, which says: "Amid calls from some liberals that she step down in time for President Obama to name her successor, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said she was fully engaged in her work." Think about why that is the teaser. But Liptak is writing because he got an interview:

Unless they have a book to sell, Supreme Court justices rarely give interviews. Justice Ginsburg has given several this summer, perhaps in reaction to calls from some liberals that she step down in time for President Obama to name her successor.

So maybe Ginsburg is talking because of political pressure about Obama's appointment opportunities, but I find that hard to believe. She's obviously not talking about that, so it's an editorial insertion, and it's therefore what the NYT editors think will pique the interest of readers. To me, a reader, it seemed really dumb, flaunting the nonnewsiness of the article. Here's another Obama-related insertion:

Were Mr. Obama to name Justice Ginsburg’s successor, it would presumably be a one-for-one liberal swap that would not alter the court’s ideological balance. But if a Republican president is elected in 2016 and gets to name her successor, the court would be fundamentally reshaped.

In case you didn't know!

So. Onto the substance of the interview:

“I am now the most senior justice when we divide 5-4 with the usual suspects,” she said.

The last two terms... were...  “heady, exhausting, challenging.”

“[I]f it’s measured in terms of readiness to overturn legislation, this is one of the most activist courts in history.”

What if it's measured in terms of acceptance of the duty to enforce the Constitution? That's a trick question. Answer: It's the same thing! (And that makes this post another occasion for my favorite tag: Paraphrase.)

The article goes on to talk about the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, which was a congressional response to Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, in which Ginsburg dissented. She notes that there were 2 Title VII case this past term, but that Congress is unlikely to reverse them by statute, because, she says, "this Congress doesn’t seem to be able to move on anything," and: "In so many instances, the court and Congress have been having conversations with each other, particularly recently in the civil rights area.... So it isn’t good when you have a Congress that can’t react."

Do you see Liptak's sleight of hand there? He went from her characterization of the Court as activist because of its "readiness to overturn legislation," to the idea of legislation overturning a court decision, but Congress can't overturn a decision that "overturns" legislation, and Ledbetter wasn't a case that overturned legislation! Ledbetter was an interpretation of a statute, so Congress was free to amend it and did. To interpret a statute isn't to overturn it. It's to read it, and Congress can change the text if it doesn't like that reading. It's not "activist" to decline to give an expansive interpretation to a statute, which is what Ginsburg wanted in her Ledbetter dissent.

When a statute is overturned because it's inconsistent with the Constitution, you can call that "activist" or you can call that meeting a judicial duty, but you can't go to Congress to get that decision overturned. [NOTE: Congress can initiate a constitutional amendment, and there are sometimes ways to rewrite a statute to solve a constitutional problem. I don't think Ginsburg was referring to that.]

Ginsburg does display some resistance to activism with respect to constitutional rights:

She said that as a general matter the court would be wise to move incrementally and methodically. It had moved too fast, she said, in Roe v. Wade, the 1973 decision that established a constitutional right to abortion. The court could have struck down only the extremely restrictive Texas law before it.

“I think it’s inescapable that the court gave the anti-abortion forces a single target to aim at,” she said. “The unelected judges decided this question for the country, and never mind that the issue was in flux in the state legislatures.”

The question of same-sex marriage is also in flux around the nation. In June, the court declined to say whether there was a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, allowing the issue to percolate further. But Justice Ginsburg rejected the analogy to the lesson she had taken from the aftermath of the Roe decision.

“I wouldn’t make a connection,” she said.

Hmm. Why not?! I'm guessing it's because Roe v. Wade is already decided. Nothing she can do will change that. The same-sex marriage issue is not yet completely resolved, and she will, in most likelihood, participate. That's a reason to simply refuse to talk about it, but I suspect, in addition to that, she will embrace the right with even more breadth and confidence than the Court in Roe v. Wade accepted abortion. This notion of allowing the difficult matter to be worked out in the political process... she won't make a connection.

***

In my Constitutional Law II exam last spring, written before the Supreme Court's decision in Windsor, I began a question this way (boldface added):

Here’s a section from one of the briefs in United States v. Windsor, the case in which the Supreme Court is considering whether a section of the Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional.

The benefits of our federalist system resonate with especial clarity regarding the same-sex marriage debate…

Preemptively short-circuiting the democratic process by announcing only one permissible policy choice by any government under the Constitution destroys these benefits and should not occur unless the Constitution clearly mandates the legitimacy of only one outcome. The Nation's experience in the wake of Roe v. Wade bears this out. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, (remarking that Roe has "sparked public opposition and academic criticism, in part . . . because the Court ventured too far in the change it ordered and presented an incomplete justification for its action). J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, (observing that Roe "shut down this process of legislative accommodation, polarizing the debate and making future compromise more difficult," leading "[m]any scholars" to comment on the "Roe backlash" and the intense partisan divide that has resulted).

Outrage in the wake of Roe occurred despite increasing public support for abortion and a "marked trend in state legislatures 'toward liberalization of abortion statutes."' Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice (quoting Roe v. Wade); see also Thoughts on Autonomy ("The political process was moving in the early 1970s, not swiftly enough for advocates of quick, complete change, but majoritarian institutions were listening and acting."). But the Court's "[h]eavy-handed judicial intervention was difficult to justify and appears to have provoked, not resolved, conflict." Thoughts on Autonomy, supra, at 385-86. Unlike the Court's previous decisions concerning gender classifications, Roe provoked backlash because it "invited no dialogue with legislators" and "seemed entirely to remove the ball from the legislators' court." Judicial Voice, supra, at 1205.

Not only did Roe produce conflict, it was also an ineffective engine of social change. The Court's abrupt adjustment of national policy "may have prevented state legislatures from working out long-lasting solutions based upon broad public consensus." Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies. Professor Sunstein observed that Roe's effectiveness "has been limited, largely because of its judicial source."

Of course, Justice Ginsburg didn't agree with the side that wrote that. She showed — to use her definition of activism, above — a readiness to overturn legislation.

"The swing vote is in (so stop kissing up)."

Writes Dana Milbank, in a slight twist of the usual lazy journalist approach to covering the Supreme Court: Inform readers that Anthony Kennedy is the swing vote, pull his statements/questions out the transcript, and riff about them — What's he thinking? Who knows? Could go either way — and let him know — subtly or unsubtly — how much you'll love him if he does what you want and how he risks his social and historical standing if he does not.

There's an issue of "standing" in both same-sex marriage cases. Standing — the legal doctrine — has to do with whether the party seeking access to the judicial process has a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the opposing party and likely to be redressed if he happens to prevail on the legal issue. But the real issue of standing — these journalists make me think — is Justice Kennedy's standing within the elite crowd of politics, academia, and journalism.

Milbank's riff is: He can already tell. 

Early in the oral argument [in Windsor], the conservatives — Antonin Scalia, Samuel Alito and Chief Justice John Roberts (a silent Clarence Thomas can be assumed to be their tacit tagalong) — explored the idea that the case might be disposed of on the technical grounds that no injury had been proved, a technique that would avoid a ruling calling DOMA unconstitutional.

But Kennedy was having none of it. “It seems to me there’s injury here,” he said.

The swing vote had swung....

Kennedy left little doubt about what he thinks the answer is. When Solicitor General Donald Verrilli argued that DOMA violated the notion of equal protection under the law, Kennedy cut him off. “You are insisting that we get to a very fundamental question about equal protection,” he said, “but we don’t do that unless we assume the law is valid otherwise to begin with.”

And if Kennedy doesn’t assume something, nobody can assume it.

The usual sucking up is not needed.

It's embarrassing to the Court that it is talked about this way, and — ironically — it makes it harder for the Court to find new/bigger individual rights that ordinary people can believe really came out of a dutiful judicial analysis of the law. That unwittingly bolsters the argument for leaving this issue in the arena of majoritarian politics.

"Ann, if you're correct and gay marriage is inevitable it might be more profitable to ask of gay marriage proponents 'How do you want to win?'"

Asks Bill in the comments, after I said: "Same-sex marriage will win whichever way the Court goes. Its opponents can only lose. Which way would they prefer to lose?" Amplifying this in the comments, I said: "Either it will win through the court cases or it will win in the political process." And:

If ssm wins through the Supreme Court, conservatives can move on to the more abstract and better principled argument against judicial activism.

If the fight continues in the political process, conservatives are going to spend years getting sidetracked into this issue -- rather than the spending and economics issues -- where they will look worse and worse to more and more people.

It's obvious to me that conservative opponents to ssm will be much better off losing in court that going through this political process.

And I think smart conservatives who are writing today in the National Review or the WSJ or wherever actually know this. They are simply pre-loading their judicial activism argument. They can't come out and say what I'm saying or their judicial activism argument won't launch.

Boldface added, because I need you to remember that.  But I want to answer Bill's question. As a proponent of same-sex marriage, how do I want to win? I want to win in the Supreme Court. But I am not hoping for Democratic Party victories in 2014 and 2016. I don't want to see more left-liberal political power leveraged by the same-sex-marriage issue. I don't want more of that distortion, and conservatives should rejoice if the Court saves them from it. Rejoice privately, of course, and move on to your high-road, anti-judicial-activism game.

But the reason I would like to see the win in the Supreme Court is because I think that's the right place to draw the line between the decisions that belong to the individual and the decisions that belong to majoritarian politics. I don't think the government has been able to articulate anything close to a good enough reason for treating committed couples differently because of the configuration of parts of their bodies that the government shouldn't be looking at anyway.

Meanwhile, if the Court decides against same-sex marriage, it will catapult the Democrats politically. They'll rage. But will it not be in (private) delight?