Minimizing the crimes of women (in a serious case about federalism).

Here's how WaPo's Robert Barnes begins his report about a case of attempted murder:

A melodramatic love triangle begat a ham-handed revenge poisoning. That led to what one Supreme Court justice called an “unimaginable” federal prosecution of the scorned wife under a law enacted to implement a global chemical weapons treaty.

As long as the victim didn't actually die, it's just some kind of joke?

Now, there is a problem with the feds taking over this prosecution, and that should be the focus of the story about this case. But you should see how outrageous it is to diminish the criminal behavior in this gendered fashion.

Carol Anne Bond, a Pennsylvania microbiologist... ordered a rare blend of chemicals, partly off the Internet, and over the next several months tried to poison [Myrlinda] Haynes 24 times by putting them on her doorknob, car and, critically, mailbox.

Just some nutty lady's bumbling parry in a cat fight?

Federal prosecutors charged Bond with violating the 1998 Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, a law based on the chemical weapons ban treaty that is signed by all but four of the world’s nations.

The problem here is not the unseriousness of attempted murder. It's that murder is traditionally left to the states, and the federal government is — at least theoretically — a government of limited, enumerated powers. With this important constitutional principle at stake, Bond is represented by the great ex-Solicitor General Paul Clement:

Clement...  said that if the law implementing the treaty “really does reach every malicious use of chemicals anywhere in the nation, as the government insists,” then it violates the “bedrock principle of our federalist system that Congress lacks a general police power to criminalize conduct” that does not have distinctly federal concern....

[Justice Elena Kagan] said the treaty gave Congress the power to pass implementing legislation. “So you have to find a constraint on the treaty power. Where does it come from?” she demanded.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor worried about the courts hamstringing efforts to deal with terrorism. 

Writing tip for Barnes: If you've already got "ham-handed," don't use "hamstringing." Too much ham.

“It would be deeply ironic that we have expended so much energy criticizing Syria, when if this court were now to declare that our joining or creating legislation to implement the treaty was unconstitutional,” she said.

Now, we're getting to the real meat of it. The government was represented by the current Solicitor General, Donald B. Verrilli Jr.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., who posed no questions to Clement, asked Verrilli if it would be possible for the president to join a treaty that gives national governments all powers and for Congress then to put in place such legislation.

When Verrilli said that would be unimaginable, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy shot back: “It also seems unimaginable that you would bring this prosecution.”

That led the conservative justices — plus Justice Stephen G. Breyer, who usually sides with the liberals — to unleash a barrage of hypotheticals of what could be prosecuted under the broad law, which covers chemicals that could harm humans or animals: a wheelbarrow full of kerosene; a poisoned potato given to a horse; the performance-enhancing drugs allegedly used by cyclist Lance Armstrong.

“Would it shock you if I told you that a few days ago my wife and I distributed toxic chemicals to a great number of children?” Alito asked Verrilli, drawing laughter from the court’s spectators. He explained that chocolate Halloween candy is “poison to dogs, so it’s a toxic chemical” under the act.

Verrilli chafed, saying, “This is serious business.”

Yes, it truly is. It's easy to see Kennedy's point: The federal government shouldn't have chosen to prosecute this case. But it did, and now what? It's easy to think: The central government needs ample power to do everything that might need to be done at a national level and it should refrain from using that power to deal with matters that are better left to the states.

But it doesn't refrain.

What do you think of Garrett Epps saying Justice Alito "looked for all the world like Sean Penn as Jeff Spicoli in Fast Times at Ridgemont High..."

"... signaling to the homies his contempt for Ray Walston as the bothersome history teacher, Mr. Hand"? Commenters at "Did Justice Alito roll his eyes while Justice Ginsburg was speaking?" let Epps have it. Does he even know the movie? Amartel said:

If Alito had ordered a pizza to be delivered to the well at the Supreme Court, or called Ginsburg a "dick" that would be, like, a totally different story.

Likewise, Youngblood says:

Spicoli doesn't act like that in the film. Now, if Justice Alito said to Justice Ginsburg, "You DICK!" or ordered a pizza in the middle of class, that would be a different story. But little niggling gestures of disrespect aren't really Spicoli-like at all.

And CatherineM:

What I find most offensive is the Spicoli reference. Has Epps ever watched Fast Times? Jeff called Hand a dick once for ripping up his excuse, but he never mocked Mr. Hand. He was incapable. He was too high.

That's his tell. Epps is lying. I object.

To sum up, here's Henry:

Jeff Spicoli is a hero. When did liberals go all in on being turgid squares?

I don't know, man, but the Supreme Court is about to close up for the summer, and maybe all Sam Alito needs are some tasty waves, a cool buzz, and he'll be fine.  When it's October, and the Justices are back for oral arguments, maybe he will order that pizza....

Did Justice Alito roll his eyes while Justice Ginsburg was speaking?

Garrett Epps and Dana Milbank think so.

Milbank says "Alito visibly mocked his colleague":

Ginsburg, the second woman to serve on the high court, was making her argument about how the majority opinion made it easier for sexual harassment to occur in the workplace when Alito, seated immediately to Ginsburg’s left, shook his head from side to side in disagreement, rolled his eyes and looked at the ceiling.

Epps:

... Alito pursed his lips, rolled his eyes to the ceiling, and shook his head "no." He looked for all the world like Sean Penn as Jeff Spicoli in Fast Times at Ridgemont High, signaling to the homies his contempt for Ray Walston as the bothersome history teacher, Mr. Hand. 

I don't trust the descriptions of Epps and Milbank. Maybe we could get some more discussion of the meaning of Alito's head — from some observers who like him. And then I could calculate the truth from there. But what would be better would be  cameras in the Supreme Court chambers. This is a new argument for cameras in the Supreme Court — to protect Samuel Alito from calumny.

Amusingly, Epps begins his little article with:

I suspect that the cause of cameras in the Supreme Court suffered a blow on Monday. I am glad the nation did not see first-hand Justice Samuel Alito's display of rudeness to his senior colleague, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.  Because Alito's mini-tantrum was silent, it will not be recorded in transcript or audio; but it was clear to all with eyes, and brought gasps from more than one person in the audience.

It wasn't clear to me, and I have eyes.

Nice of Epps to want to protect me and the rest of Americans who didn't make it into the courtroom that day, but I prefer to be free to look things and form my own opinion, not to get second-hand descriptions from partisans and polemicists.

And by the way, the notion that female Justices command stronger displays of decorum than male Justices is sexist. Show some real respect.

AND: Do I detect anti-Italian prejudice? Alito is too visibly expressive. He's like a movie character with an Italian name (Spicoli)? The rule is your face should be a mask? WASP-style?

ALSO: Remember the words of one of the world's greatest Italian-Americans:



MOREOVER: Want to bet that if emotions played across the visage of Sonia Sotomayor while Alito or Scalia were articulating some nugget of conservatism that media's Epps and Milbanks would tell us that this — this! — was the empathy Obama said was essential to judging?

AND: A new post highlighting comments about what's wrong with likening Alito to Spicoli.

Another day of Supreme Court excitement.

The place to hang out is SCOTUSblog, which live-blogs it, or here, where I quote, paraphrase, and snark, and you can comment.

UPDATE 1: Koontz, written by Alito. "The government's demand for property from a land use permit applicant must satisfy the Nolan and Dolan requirements even when it denies the permit." 5-4 in the most predictable 5-4 pattern.

UPDATE 2: Next, a case we talked about here, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl. This, too, is written by Justice Alito. "Assuming for the sake of argument that the biological father is a parent under the Indian Child Welfare Act, neither of the two sections at issue bars the termination of his parental rights." Thomas and Breyer have concurring opinions. Scalia has a dissenting opinion, for himself alone. Sotomayor also dissents, with Ginsburg and Kagan. And Scalia joins the Sotomayor dissent in part.

UPDATE 3: Here's the PDF for Adoptive Couple. To jump to what Scalia says:

The Court’s opinion, it seems to me, needlessly demeans the rights of parenthood. It has been the constant practice of the common law to respect the entitlement of those who bring a child into the world to raise that child. We do not inquire whether leaving a child with his parents is “in the best interest of the child.” It sometimes is not; he would be better off raised by someone else. But parents have their rights, no less than children do. This father wants to raise his daughter, and the statute amply protects his right to do so. There is no reason in law or policy to dilute that protection.

UPDATE 4: Huge: "Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional. Its formula can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance." This is Shelby County, written by Chief Justice Roberts. "Thomas concurs. Ginsburg dissents, joined by Breyer Sotomayor, and Kagan.... Section 4 is unconstitutional in light of current conditions. In 1966, the formula was rational in both practice and theory." [ADDED: It's 5-4, again, the typical conservative/liberal split, and Thomas — along with Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito — joins the Chief.]

UPDATE 5: Here's my discussion of the oral argument from last March: "[C]ongressional support for reauthorizing the act has increased over the years, even though the need for it has lessened.... Scalia is saying the Court needs to act because there is a dysfunction in the political process that keeps Congress from looking rationally at the actual need for the remedy that made so much sense back in 1965. Breyer's response is: Congress is still in the middle of doing what was once badly needed, it's not obvious that the endpoint has been reached, and therefore it's not time yet for the Court to act." Apparently, the majority decided it was time.

UPDATE 6: That's it — and that's plenty! — for today. Here's the PDF of the opinion in Shelby County. I'll start a new post for that case, and I will also try to get to Adoptive Couple before long. 

Immensely exciting morning at the Supreme Court.

Live-blogged at SCOTUSblog.

UPDATE 1: We're waiting for the University of Texas affirmative action case (Fisher), the 2 same-sex marriage cases (on Prop 8 (Hollingsworth) and DOMA (Windsor), and the Voting Rights Act case (Shelby County). I'm feeling that we're going to get a whole lot of minimalism here. Fisher will be about the peculiarities of the UT program. Prop 8 will fizzle on something technical. Windsor herself will keep her remedy, but DOMA will survive. And the Voting Rights Act will survive. If so, that will be the excitement of no excitement. Get ready.

UPDATE 2: The cert. grants have been announced, and they include review of the President's recess appointment power. The case arises out of Obama's interpretation of what counts as a congressional recess, and involves 3 appointments to the NLRB. Details on the case — NLRB v. Canning — here. More details here.

UPDATE 3: The Court affirms the 7th Circuit in Vance, 5-4, Alito writing: "a supervisor for vicarious [liability] under Title VII only if she has the power given by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim." The 4 dissenters are the 4 liberals.

UPDATE 4: Another opinion by Alito, Mutual Pharmaceuticals v. Bartlett. Also 5-4. Federal law about drug warnings preempts state law remedies based on "design defect."

UPDATE 5: In Vance, Ginsburg, dissenting, compares the majority's narrow reading of the statute to Ledbetter, which became a big political issue. Congress subsequently amended the statute. So Ginsburg says: "Congress has, in the recent past, intervened to correct this Court’s wayward interpretations of Title VII.... The ball is once again in Congress’ court to correct the error into which this Court has fallen, and to restore the robust protections against workplace harassment the Court weakens today." I assume the majority has no problem with that. It's statutory interpretation, and if Congress wants this greater liability for employers, it can/should amend the statute.

UPDATE 6: Breyer writes the 7-2 opinion in U.S. v. Kebodoeux: "Registration requirement under SORNA as applied to Kebodeaux falls within the scope of Congress's authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause." SORNA is the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. The dissenters are Scalia and Thomas.

UPDATE 7: Fisher! 7-1, only Ginsburg dissenting. Vacated and remanded "because the Fifth Circuit did not hold the university to the demanding burden of strict scrutiny articulated in Grutter and Bakke, its decision afffiming the district court's grant of summary judgment was incorrect." (I'm starting a new post for Fisher and working on reading the case.)

UPDATE 8: The last opinion is UT Southwestern v. Nassar, also by Kennedy: "The Court holds that Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of 'but for' causation..." This one is 5-4, split as you'd predict a 5-4 split would split. Ginsburg writes the dissent.

UPDATE 9: There will be more opinions tomorrow.

"This result is a good one if you like free speech, and fear that government funding can be used as a powerful tool to shape private speech (potentially thought, too)."

"But make no mistake about the context: Roberts and Alito are gearing up for a world where exemptions and protections from generally applicable laws will be sought primarily by conservative groups. The main framework will probably be religious liberty, which opponents of same-sex marriage have increasingly identified as the value under attack when government recognizes same-sex marriage and requires various organizations to do the same. But free exercise of religion is in the First Amendment, too. If he could be made to understand the new emerging politics of the First Amendment, Rehnquist’s anguished ghost might be appeased."

Writes Harvard lawprof Noah Feldman, about the Supreme Court's decision today in Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. (which we've been talking about in some detail, here). Feldman's article, at Bloomberg.com, is titled "Roberts's Liberal Ruling Will Protect Conservatives."

Read the whole thing to understand the role of "Rehnquist’s anguished ghost."

"Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito tosses first pitch at Rangers game, dishes on his love of baseball."

The Dallas Morning News has the story:

Before Wednesday’s game, when his high and tight two-seamer would have started a riot in a Dodgers-Diamondbacks game, Alito had thrown out a first pitch twice: once at a spring training game between the Phillies and Tampa Bay, the other at a regular season game in Philadelphia.

How did those go?

“In Philly, I thought it was good. The fact that the Phillie Phanatic caught it without a glove was slightly insulting to the speed of it.”

Slightly insulting to the speed of it...

I guess he threw the pitch — as they say in the Supreme Court — with all deliberate speed.

ADDED: The lawprof in me wants to probe into the statement that "the Phillie Phanatic caught it without a glove." What is the meaning of "glove"?



Is that "hand" not also/inherently a "glove"? It's not as if there are nerve endings in the green material of the costume. The human hand is inside that "hand," which can be said to make it a "glove," especially in the context where the issue is whether the ball hit so softly that the hand would not be hurt. On the other... hand... perhaps all that matters is the symbolism, and the "hand" however well-padded symbolizes a hand and not a glove, so even without any potential for pain, even from a fast pitch, the lack of a symbolic catcher's mitt sent the message that the pitch was weak.

And now that I'm getting this technical, do you want to criticize Alito for using the word "glove" rather than "mitt"?

"The National Voter Registration Act of 1993, allows voters to register using a federal form that asks, 'Are you a citizen of the United States?'"

"Prospective voters must check a box for yes or no, and they must sign the form, swearing under the penalty of perjury that they are citizens. The state law, by contrast, required prospective voters to prove that they were citizens by providing copies of or information concerning various documents, including birth certificates, passports, naturalization papers or driver’s licenses, that are available only to people who are in the state lawfully."

The Supreme Court, 7-2, said the federal law preempted the state law, Adam Liptak explains:

Much of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion concerned the meaning of the phrase “accept and use.” Arizona officials argued that they do accept and use the form, but also require additional information. An airline may accept and use e-tickets, they said, but also require identification....

In the decision on Monday, Justice Scalia said the phrase “accept and use,” when understood in context, meant that the federal form had to be accepted as sufficient.  

Here's the opinion,  Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council. I see that Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, considered using a presumption against preemption that "rests on an assumption... that 'Congress does not exercise lightly' the 'extraordinary power' to 'legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the States.'" (The internal quotes go to Gregory v. Ashcroft, a 1991 opinion that resolved an ambiguity in the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act to preserve state laws that force judges into retirement at a specified age.)

In the Arizona case, Scalia said that the presumption doesn't apply because Congress enacted the law under the Elections Clause. (Art. I, §4, cl. 1: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the places of chusing Senators.”)

Justice Kennedy, concurring, rejected the idea of "a hierarchy of federal powers so that some statutes pre-empting state law must be interpreted by different rules than others, all depending upon which power Congress has exercised." It's still an area of traditional state regulation, and it would make more sense to question the presumption — he says, citing an old Scalia concurrence that did just that — than to minimize the state's concern, given that they are acting in "their own historic role in the conduct of elections." But Kennedy concurs because there's no ambiguity in the National Voter Registration Act that the presumption would resolve. The preemption is clear.

Only 2 justices dissented. Justice Thomas said the Constitution gives the states the exclusive authority over voter qualifications and over whether those qualifications are met, so he adopted the narrower interpretation of the NVRA to avoid an unnecessary constitutional question. Justice Alito said that the Court got it "exactly backwards" when it rejected the presumption against preemption because of the Elections Clause. The Elections Clause manifests a reservation of "default responsibility" to the states, so Congress should have to "speak clearly" to displace the states as they carry out this function the Constitution explicitly assigned to them.

Alito took what had been Sandra Day O'Connor's seat on the court. As Liptak notes, Justice O'Connor was one of the 3 judges who initially heard the case in the 9th Circuit, and she was sitting in the courtroom today as the opinion was announced.

The Fisher v. University of Texas affirmative action case is now the only undecided case argued in October.

SCOTUSblog tells us, after live-blogging the announcement of Moncrieffe v. Holder this morning. Moncrieffe, a case about the meaning of "aggravated felony" under the immigration law, was written by Justice Sotomayor, and that makes it extremely likely that Justice Kennedy is writing the hotly anticipated Fisher case:

[T]he Court tries very hard to distribute the authorship of majority opinions evenly not just over the course of the Term, but also within a sitting (the two-week periods from October through April when the Court hears oral argument). So going into today, Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor were the only Justices without majority opinions in October.... Now he's the only one without an October opinion, which leads to the assumption that he is writing Fisher. 

Does this help predict the outcome of the case? Here's my effort, from last October, to read Justice Kennedy at the oral argument. Remember, Texas has a very odd kind of affirmative action, adding an individualized approach, with race as a plus factor, after a facially neutral program that admits the top 10% of students from every Texas high school. At oral argument, Kennedy focused on the detail that the additional race-based selection was done to bring in more privileged black and Hispanic students, because the 10% program tended to admit underprivileged blacks and Hispanics (which reinforced a stereotype about black and Hispanic people). I said at the time (referring to the Court's most recent affirmative action case, Grutter):

So, it seems, the additional affirmative action is needed to get a more varied group of minority students, in which case, the point is to bring in privileged minority students, because these are the students who — in Grutter terms — might provide the classroom benefit of teaching all the students that minority students don't have "some characteristic minority viewpoint." ...

I'm not taking a position on whether UT's admissions policy is good or whether it's constitutional.... All I am saying is that if Grutter is to be applied (and not limited or overruled), an affirmative action program that's all about boosting the most privileged minority students actually makes sense.

Kennedy seemed to have trouble seeing the sense of that at oral argument. He said "So what you're saying is that what counts is race above all," which is missing the point. I'm sure he ultimately understood the point, but I think we saw — in real time — that the point isn't intuitively appealing to him.

That said, Fisher could narrowly reject the odd UT program and leave the more typical Grutter-style affirmative action alone. But Fisher presents an opportunity to overturn Grutter, and Kennedy dissented in Grutter, which was a 5-4 decision with Justice O'Connor casting the deciding vote. O'Connor's successor, Justice Alito was instrumental at oral argument — as I said at the time — in extracting that point about privileged minority applicants receiving the advantage.

So I'll make a rash prediction: a narrow decision, determined by Kennedy and Alito (and maybe Roberts), striking down only the Texas program. Scalia and Thomas concur, complaining that Grutter should have been overruled. Everyone else dissents.

"If California provides all the substantive benefits of marriage to same-sex domestic partnerships, are you seriously arguing that... if the case before us now were from a State that doesn't provide any of those benefits to same-sex couples, this case would come out differently?"

Justice Alito asked Ted Olson in the Prop 8 oral argument yesterday. Consider the problem of trying to narrow the case by limiting it to California, where voters amended the state constitution to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples and where they permit civil unions that give gay people access to everything but the word "marriage."

There was much talk about the perversity of imposing more severe constitutional limitations on a state that has done much — but not everything — to include gay people and to give great leeway to the states that have excluded gay people altogether.

It does make some sense. The states that resist any inclusion have preserved arguments about the function of marriage that states like California have given up by structuring civil unions to provide almost equal treatment. It's hard to articulate a legitimate interest in only withholding the name.

But if the Court wants to leave the issue of same-sex marriage to the political process, why would it attach a consequence to taking the intermediate step of creating the civil unions category? That hampers the very process it would be purporting to enable.

ADDED: Later in the argument, Justice Scalia had this colloquy with Solicitor General Verrilli (who argued against Prop 8):

GENERAL VERRILLI: We are not … taking the position that it is required throughout the country. We think that that ought to be left open for a future adjudication in other States that don't have the situation California has.

JUSTICE SCALIA: So your -- your position is only if a State allows civil unions does it become unconstitutional to forbid same-sex marriage, right?

Amusingly, at exactly this point, Verrilli’s time’s-up red light comes on and he says” “It’s on.” He could have said, “Saved by the light!” But Chief Justice Roberts tells him to go on.

GENERAL VERRILLI: … I would just take out a red pen and take the word "only" out of that sentence. When that is true, then the Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of same-sex marriage, and it's an open question otherwise.

In other words, to recapture that “only” and put it in a paraphrase: He’s only arguing now that his argument is limited to states like California. If he wins this case, in the next case, when the other issue is presented, he will argue that ssm is required everywhere. Anyone can predict that. Roberts pushes:

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You [say] it's got to happen right now in California, but you don't even have a position about whether it's required in the rest of the country.

GENERAL VERRILLI: If -- with respect to a State that allows gay couples to have children and to have families and then denies the stabilizing effect.

What state doesn’t “allow” gay couples to have children and families? I can infer that Verrilli means allow adoption by gay couples, but it’s obvious that the concern about children extends to all the states, since a gay person can be a natural parent to a child and then live with a partner who is not the child’s parents.

Roberts doesn’t pursue that but sticks with his original point. Presumably, he's building the argument that it's incoherent to strike down Prop 8 without finding a right to ssm that applies to all the states.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So it's got to happen right away in those States where same-sex couples have every legal right that married couples do.

GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, we think… you can wait in…

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: States where they have fewer legal rights.

GENERAL VERRILLI: What I said is it's an open question with respect to those States and the Court should wait and see what kind of a record a State could make. But in California you can't make the record to justify the exclusion….

Verrilli is saying that the state that permits adoption by gay couples can’t go back to the argument that a child is better off having both a mother and a father in the home. Does this cure the incoherence? I doubt it. It's a distinction that might be employed by a judge who looks forward to extending ssm to all the states in the next case. I don't think Roberts is one of those judges.

"The government’s use of trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."

Justice Scalia writes in a new Supreme Court opinion. This is one of those 5-4 cases where Scalia and Thomas join the liberal Justices. It's not 6-3 because Justice Breyer joins the conservatives.

Here's the PDF of the case.

[W]e need not decide whether the officers’ investigation of Jardines’ home violated his expectation of privacy under Katz. One virtue of the Fourth Amendment’s property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy. That the officers learned what they learned only by physically intruding on Jardines’ property to gather evidence is enough to establish that a search occurred.

The dog had gone up onto the porch — that is, the curtilage: "The front porch is the classic exemplar of an area 'to which the activity of home life extends.'"

Justice Kagan (with Sotomayor and Ginsburg) joins Scalia's opinion "in full" and riffs on Scalia's "keeps easy cases easy" by quipping that adding the expectation of privacy analysis would "make 'an easy cas[e] easy” twice over.'"

Alito writes the dissenting opinion. The police came onto the property, but only on "the customary path," during the daytime, and for "less than a minute or two." As for privacy:

A reasonable person understands that odors emanating from a house may be detected from locations that are open to the public, and a reasonable person will not count on the strength of those odors remaining within the range that, while detectible by a dog, cannot be smelled by a human.

Alito's opinion is much more dog-positive than Scalia's or Kagan's. Scalia and Kagan refer to "the dog" — it's basically a tool of the police to them. Kagan compares the dog's nose to the "thermal imaging device" in Kyllo. Alito calls the dog by name: Franky. Alito's got footnotes to things like "A Dog's History of America: How Our Best Friend Explored, Conquered, and Settled a Continent."

You decide:
	Aw, it's Franky! It's man's best friend!
	Well, no. It's the cops.
pollcode.com free polls

"Anyone entering the Supreme Court’s chamber Monday morning expecting constitutional drama over the right to vote had to come away quite disappointed."

"It took all of fifty minutes of a one-hour argument to get to any constitutional issue, most of the Justices wanted to focus on what 'may only' means in a federal law...."

Since Congress only specified that states “may require only” some information, and gave them explicit permission to find ways to verify eligibility, Arizona has argued that the two mandates can exist side by side....

Alito... sought to drive home a worry about states’ ability to ensure voter eligibility by outlining a hypothetical.  A boy, the Justice suggested, who looks to be thirteen years old rides up to a registration office on his bicycle, wearing a T-shirt from a middle school, and seeks to register.  Alito then asked:  “Can the state require him to show some proof of age?"